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Abstract 
 
Childhood genetic testing raises complex ethical and moral dilemmas for both families and 
professionals. In the family sphere, the role of communication is a key aspect in the 
transmission of `genetic responsibility’ between adults and children. In the professional 
sphere, genetic responsibility is an interactional accomplishment emerging from competing 
views over what constitutes the `best interests’ of the child in relation to parental preferences 
on the one hand, and professional codes of practice on the other. In the present paper we 
extend our previous research into parental accounts of childhood genetic testing and explore 
the ethical explanations/descriptions of professionals in research interviews. Interviews 
(n=20) were conducted with professional practitioners involved in the genetic diagnosis and 
management of children and their families. We first identify four inter-related themes – 
juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child’s autonomy, elicitation of the child’s 
autonomy, avoidance of parental responsibility and acknowledgement of uncertainty – and 
then, using Rhetorical Discourse Analysis, examine the range of devices through which 
ethical explanations are situationally illustrated: contrast, reported speech, constructed 
dialogue, character and event work. An important device for facilitating ethical explanations 
is the use of extreme case scenarios which reconstructs dilemmas as justifications of 
professional conduct. While acknowledging ambivalence, our analysis of professional 
accounts suggests that ethical practice is not a simple matter of implementing principles but 
managing the practical consequences of interactions with parents and children. We conclude 
that more attention is needed to understand the way professional practitioners construct and 
share cases as useful illustrations of evidence-based ethical practice. 
 
Key words: professional ethics, accounts, genetic counselling, genetic testing of children, 
rhetorical discourse analysis  
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INTRODUCTION 
Professional accounts of ethical practice 
Advances in medical/molecular genetics have led to an increasing availability of accurate 
tests for a range of heritable disorders. This will place new and more numerous demands on 
the relationship between professionals, patients and family members. Genetic testing will 
continue to raise ethical dilemmas about informed consent, about who can legitimately ask 
for a test, and how to negotiate competing responsibilities between families and 
professionals. On the family side, people already face complex choices and obligations about 
knowing or not knowing their genetic status (Chadwick, 2004) as well as disclosing or not 
disclosing genetic information to relatives who may be equally ambivalent about their genetic 
future (Hallowell, 1999, 2003; Foster et al., 2003). The scenario becomes more complex 
when it involves genetic testing of children, which is our focus here. Genetic professionals 
are required to follow a set of ethical guidelines while facilitating alignments with parents 
and at the same time preserving the `best interests’ of the child (Clarke and Flinter, 1996; 
Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke, 2008). However, less is known about the practical 
ethical challenges that face genetic professionals.  
 
In a different context to childhood genetic testing, Taylor and White (2000) argue that 
within social work, which is rooted in evidence-based practice, exclusive attention is given to 
how knowledge is used rather than how it is made or constructed. They discursively illustrate 
how social workers routinely categorise people as blameworthy or responsible and construct 
morally persuasive versions of events which lead to `affective’ judgements about cases. For 
them `reflexivity’ is a matter of understanding the practical-moral activity of social work, in 
which case professionals are urged to critically interrogate their own assumptions. In a 
similar vein, Hall, Slembrouck and Sarangi (2006) examine practices of accountability and 
 4
categorisation among social workers in policy review interviews. They show that narratives 
are important displays of professional competence, which seek to justify difficult actions such 
as placing children in residential care.  
 
Despite the growing interest in professional accountability (Bernhardt et al., 2000), few 
studies have actually examined the construction of professional accounts within clinical 
genetics and genetic counselling. Recent studies have examined the complex and innovative 
ways in which professionals balance and reconcile morally contentious aspects of genetic 
technology such as stem cell research (Wainwright et al., 2006), in vitro fertilisation (IVF) 
(Ehrich et al., 2006) and preimplantation technologies (PGD) (Williams et al., 2007). For 
example, Ehrich et al. have shown how staff engage in `ethical boundary work’ as they 
reflexively justify and balance tensions between the medical legitimacy and social 
accountability of controversial clinical procedures.  
 
In this paper we investigate the detailed accounts of genetics professionals – to include 
clinical geneticists, genetic counsellors and paediatricians – involved in childhood testing. By 
`accounts’ we mean the activity of reporting troubles or explaining problematic events 
(Antaki, 1994). As action-oriented performances, accounts seek to construct various strategic 
versions of reality, to morally position actors/speakers, and engage in perspective-taking. 
This has obvious implications for the communication of ethical dilemmas as illustrations of 
evidence-based practice. First, we review the case for why professional accounts increase 
awareness and understanding of bioethical dilemmas. Next, we identify the main themes of 
our interview data, and conduct a detailed rhetorical discourse analysis of key extracts. This 
is followed by a discussion of our findings: linking rhetorical aspects of ethical dilemmas to 
justifications of professional practice.  
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Professional ethics and genetics 
Beauchamp and Childress (1984) are routinely credited with principle-based ethics, 
famously known as the Georgetown mantra of `beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and 
justice’. From the professional practitioners’ perspective, as Campbell (1984: 4) points out, 
`the more concerned the professions of medicine and nursing have become about the 
formulation of codes of ethics, the more they have become aware of the complexity of the 
moral problems facing them’. Since the adoption of ethical `codes’ and `guidelines’ in the US 
and in Europe1, there have been parallel debates within sociology and philosophy about the 
prescriptive, and possibly unhelpful, nature of code-oriented professional ethics (Pill et al., 
2004, Gert et al., 1996). Tadd (1994) has shown in the context of nursing that codes not only 
frustrate the moral climate of work and fail to raise standards of care, but systematically 
disempower nurses. In a similar vein, Edgar (1994) argues that professional codes of ethics 
within social work prevent and marginalize innovations at the local level. More generally, 
Wainwright and Pattison (2004: 121) observe that codes are `problematic at best’ and should 
not bring closure to confusion and debate, but enable professionals to dynamically foster a 
sense of virtue that `become better reflections on values within professional practice’. 
Criticism of this kind has prompted other scholars to consider a more contextualist reading of 
professional ethics (Weisz, 1990; Taylor and White, 2000). Following this latter trend, we 
suggest that professional and ethical dilemmas are fabricated and communicated through 
complex discourse practices – narrative frameworks, rhetorical devices and interactional 
moves – to underscore the accountability of professional practice. 
 
                                                 
1 The first Code of Ethics (COE) were developed by the National Society of Genetic Counsellors (NSGC) in the 
US and were officially inaugurated and published in 1992 (cf. Benkendorf et al., 1992). The UK Clinical 
Genetics Society (CGS) developed a similar (non-regulatory) framework of `principles and guidelines’ in 1994. 
This was followed by similar frameworks in Europe. A set of international guidelines for `Ethical Issues in 
Medical Genetics’ were prepared for the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1998.  
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There are very few studies that examine professional dilemmas in the context of genetic 
counselling services (Callahan et al., 1995; Maley, 1994). Callahan et al. (1995) derived case 
studies from professionals’ experiences and conducted a review of the counselling literature. 
They concluded that professional understandings of ethical and social dilemmas were mostly 
general and derivative. A more thorough review was needed to identify, classify and resolve 
ethical cases within medical genetics. Responding to this call, McCarthy Veach et al. (2001) 
conducted focus groups with genetic counsellors, nurses and physicians, identifying 16 major 
categories and 63 subcategories of `ethical and professional dilemmas’. In a follow-up study, 
Bower et al. (2002) developed these same categories into a survey (n=454) so as to devise 
ethical strategies for genetic counsellors. The frequency and variety of challenges (esp. 
informed consent and value conflicts) implied that respondents recommended a more 
directive approach towards the process of genetic counselling. The authors argued for more 
research (e.g. personal interviews) to explore the use of dilemma-specific strategies in 
different counselling situations, which aligns with the main aims of the present study. The 
present study aims to isolate some of the key dilemmas and illustrate how professionals go 
about accounting for them. 
 
Before we turn our attention to the present focus, it is worth acknowledging how early 
studies of professionals’ accounts of genetic counselling have concentrated on how risk 
information is conveyed to clients (Rapp, 1988). Bosk’s (1993) study of a genetic counselling 
unit found that counsellors placed such a high premium on `correct information’ and `non-
directiveness’ that they often ignored the personal considerations of the client. Accountability 
was explicitly framed in terms of the quality of information provided, not the outcome of the 
patient’s decision. While patient autonomy is upheld as an ethical ideal for many 
professionals, the right to choose or decide may be personally experienced as a moral and 
 7
psychological burden (Hallowell, 1999). Many studies have noted that where abstract ethical 
principles contradict each other there is very little guidance as to how particular situations 
should be managed by counsellors2 (Huibers and van `t Spijker, 1998; van Berkel and van der 
Weele, 1998; Wüstner, 2003). In her work on the interactional activity of genetic counselling, 
Pilnick (2002) also shows how principles of patient autonomy and non-directiveness are 
interactionally difficult to reconcile. She argues that ethical principles in their abstract form 
are unable to adequately engage in the practical and local contingencies of counselling. 
 
Childhood genetic testing 
Since the mid-80s, the professional community have recognised the potential for 
inappropriate testing of healthy children (Craufurd and Harris, 1986; Harper and Clarke, 
1990). Ethical guidelines clearly stipulate that genetic testing is recommended only if there is 
clear medical or psychosocial benefit to the child (Clinical Genetics Society, 1994). Despite 
the profession’s explicit ethical stand, some studies attest to regular parental demands for 
predictive or carrier testing of healthy children (Chapple et al., 1996; Campbell et al., 2003). 
While the ethics of predictive testing is less equivocal, recent European surveys on carrier 
testing of `incompetent children’ indicate geographical and cultural variations in professional 
attitudes (Borry et al., 2007). Some have stressed the need for wider empirical research into 
the views of relevant stakeholders (Borry et al., 2005).  
 
As far as immediate stakeholders are concerned, dilemmas in childhood testing often 
reveal a three-party tension between parents, professionals, and children. On the parental 
side, professionals are cast as the means through genetic information about the child is 
accessed. On the professional side, genetic counsellors may frame parental uncertainty and 
                                                 
2 This tension between codes of ethics and mundane professional practice has been also discussed in the 
`Genethics Club’, which is a national forum for the discussion of practical ethical problems amongst clinical 
genetic departments in the United Kingdom (cf. http://www.ethox.org.uk/ethics-support/the-genethics-club).  
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anxiety in terms of seeking psychological assurance or wanting to know their child’s genetic 
status, and will include the child’s autonomy for legal and ethical reasons (McConkie-Rosell 
et al., 1999; Hamann et al., 2000). Sarangi and Clarke (2002) have explored the subtle 
negotiation of decisions between clinicians and clients over childhood carrier testing within 
an ethos of non-directive counselling. They show how nondirective counselling seeks to 
facilitate interaction while discourage testing by contrasting the child’s future autonomy 
against the parent’s current rights. Such contrastive strategies allow the counsellor to offer 
`recommended options’ without explicitly countering the mother’s concerns. In the family 
context, parental explanations and descriptions of family communication reveal a precarious, 
and not always convincing, balance between parental responsibility and the child’s 
autonomy. Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke (2008) have shown how parental accounts 
strategically portray a dialogic family which foregrounds child autonomy with regard to 
issues of how and when to disclose genetic information to children, of deciding whether or 
not to test etc. In this paper we shift our attention to professional accounting practices which 
no doubt embed, as we will see, parents’ and children’s perspectives.  
 
METHODS 
Twenty participants were recruited from paediatric and genetic services in Cardiff 
(Wales) and London. Both convenience and snowball sampling were used to contact 
professionals who, by either academic reputation or clinical experience, had worked on cases 
involving children and genetic services. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
paediatricians (n=10), clinical geneticists (n=2), and genetic counsellors (n=8), asking 
specifically to provide retrospective accounts of difficult or challenging cases involving 
genetic testing of children. The interviewees were also asked to give explanations of their 
ethical orientation about matters relating to the competence and maturity of children, the 
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concept of autonomy, the ethical differences surrounding predictive and carrier testing, and 
the difficulties of practicing nondirective counselling.  
 
A broad thematic analysis was conducted on the transcripts using an iterative technique of 
close reading, note-taking and coding. The coding criteria were based on the interactional 
aspects of `reporting troubles’ (Morris, 1994) vis-à-vis heritable risk and childhood testing. 
Accounts of professional and ethical dilemmas were also identified via categorisations of 
conduct and reported tensions between different participants (e.g. mothers, fathers, 
practitioners, children, etc.). After coding and checking, a total of (n=26) extracts were 
compiled into a sub-corpus for more detailed inspection and analysis. A total of four themes 
were identified that capture the range and variation of professional dilemmas:  
 
Juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child’s autonomy 
Elicitation of the child’s autonomy 
Avoidance of parental responsibility 
Acknowledgement of uncertainty 
 
As separate themes within our sub-corpus, each places a different emphasis on the role and 
character of participants, of the particular circumstances of events, around which ethical 
dilemmas are constructed. Before presenting our more detailed rhetorical discourse analysis 
we should briefly explain each of these themes. Fig 1 represents a summary of our thematic 
analysis, accompanied by an `exemplar’ account of each professional/ethical dilemma.  
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Figure 1. Thematic categories of professional accounts 
Theme Exemplar account 
Juxtaposition of parental 
rights vis-à-vis  
child’s autonomy 
And they have two children of, I don’t know, let’s say six and eight. 
And the father is adamant that these two children should be tested, 
have carrier testing performed. And in that he’s a very aggressive, 
pushy, difficult man 
Elicitation of the child’s 
autonomy 
You ask a twelve year old a question that you might ask normal adult 
… You don’t get a question-answer- but when you chat to them and 
talk to them stuff comes out, bits and pieces, dribs and drabs, very 
frustrating, as a counsellor, you’re thinking it’s taking so much time. 
And you don’t know when it’s going to come or how it’s going to 
come.  
Avoidance of parental 
responsibility 
And I said look, you know, I’m feeling very uncomfortable about 
dealing with these issues with this girl because she came to the clinic 
on her own, these are big issues we’ve got to discuss, and I’m not clear 
why the family aren’t supporting her. 
Acknowledgement of 
uncertainty 
And I don’t know because it is a bit of a struggle, there’s part of me 
that wants him to recognise that what he’s doing actually is about 
control, it’s about his own anxiety and it actually isn’t about the benefit 
of the children, is my belief, now I might be wrong 
 
 
`Juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child’s autonomy’ represented the most 
common dilemma in which parents were seeking or demanding a genetic test without 
considering the autonomy of the child. Parental rights were posed as a problem when the 
`aggressive’ mother or the `pushy’ father resisted or ignored the ethical, moral or 
psychological implications of childhood testing. `Elicitation of the child’s autonomy’ 
represented the professional difficulties of assessing the child’s capacity or recruiting their 
consent in matters of testing and/or diagnosis. `Avoidance of parental responsibility’ 
described the scenario in which parental rights or responsibilities were largely absent, which 
often posed difficulties for the child’s autonomy. Lastly, `acknowledgement of uncertainty’ 
represented those accounts in which professionals were clearly ambivalent about their own 
responsibility. They described both a personal and professional conflict of views, often 
weighing whether it was ethical to deny parental demands for testing, whether `counselling’ 
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was in the best interests of the family, or whether it was actually possible to `facilitate’ the 
child’s autonomy.  
 
From our sub-corpus, we selected for each theme the most illustrative and exemplary 
accounts for Rhetorical Discourse Analysis (Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke, 2008a; 
2008b). This entailed identifying and explaining a range of devices through which 
ethical/moral explanations are constructed: contrast, reported speech, constructed dialogue, 
character and event work. Contrast structures (Smith, 1978) are effective ways of not only 
categorising behaviour and identity, but also establishing different versions of events. 
Constructed dialogue, or `reported speech’, is one device widely used in accounts to recruit 
voices and authenticate different versions of events. Character work is strategically deployed 
as moral descriptions/categorisations of conduct which facilitate ethical perspective-taking. 
Similarly, event work offers a re-interpretation of temporal (past/future) events to suit the 
speaker’s current concerns. Together, these devices reconstruct extreme case scenarios to 
facilitate explanations of dilemmas which justify professional conduct. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
A notable characteristic of professional accounts were the ways in which descriptions of 
characters and events created a `scenario’ of ethical tensions between different parties. For 
example, the three-party tension (professional-parents-child) was the most common form of 
dilemma in which professional practice was contested or rendered uncertain. The four-party 
tension (professional-mother-father-child) were examples of more complex cases usually 
involving further troubles between the parents (e.g. when childhood testing was used as an 
instrument for attributing family blame or justifying divorce). In all these cases, 
professionals, parents, children and/or other family members were encoded as key 
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participants to endorse professional practice in strategic ways. Different kinds of accounts 
would place the emphasis of ethical or moral concern on different participants. For example, 
is it the child’s autonomy that becomes grounds for ethical concern or the rights of the parent 
seeking testing?  
 
Juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis child’s autonomy: the means-end rationale 
As we mentioned earlier, the most common ethical dilemma among professional accounts 
involved the reconstruction of scenarios in which parental rights seem to supersede the `best 
interests’ of the child. Variations on this theme ranged from the number of participants 
encoded as well as descriptions of presumed motivations that `drove’ parental 
concerns/desires for childhood testing. In the simplest version of this dilemma, a single 
parent (usually the mother) becomes the principal figure of moral accounting. In the account 
below, for instance, a genetic counsellor (GC) is describing a `second referral’ case involving 
a woman with Familial Adenomatous Polyposis (FAP) who `came in wanting all five of her 
children tested’.  
 
Extract 1 
GC: I was referred to them as a second referral, and the approach of the person who had seen them 
had been very much, no, we don’t do that- sorry, so she had become very cemented in this, I’ve 
got to have this test (.) she was also, to her credit, she was quite upfront about the reasons for 
that, it was very much for herself (.) she has Desmoid Disease where they develop benign 
tumours that develop and they grow (.) they’re pretty much untreatable, managed with 
chemotherapy to keep them at a reasonable size (.) but the outlook for her wasn’t particularly 
good, and so she was saying, I want to know what my children have, so that I can die in peace 
basically (.) it was for her anxiety and her worries about the future and wanting to know what 
was going to happen to her children. 
 
There are two important aspects of this account that are worth considering. Firstly, the 
framing of the case as one in which the mother was initially refused testing by another 
professional colleague. This follows from an earlier remark that counsellors should not 
explicitly refuse childhood testing, but apply more subtle strategies of persuasion. She 
stipulated that it was better to say `why we don’t normally offer it’ in order to avoid the 
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scenario where parents might become adamant about testing. The account therefore serves as 
an exemplar for avoiding such scenarios in practice. This relates to the other purpose of the 
account. Secondly, it engages in the moral profiling of the mother who becomes `cemented’ 
on what she cannot have (`I’ve got to have this test’), which, as it transpires, is not so much to 
diagnose risk in her children, but to assuage her own fears. Counsellors often reported that 
families requesting a genetic test for their children rarely considered the prospect that testing 
may indeed identify risk which may or may not materialise. Additionally, the accounts of 
`benefits of knowing’ one’s risk may suppress those of `risks of knowing’ (Sarangi et al., 
2003). Parents often thought of testing as a means of eliminating risk, of neutralising their 
fears, not confirming them. On the surface, the mother’s argument may seem compelling 
given her poor prognosis: `I want to know what my children have, so that I can die in peace 
basically’, but the counsellor’s contrasting point is to show that she has evidently failed to 
consider the probability of her children’s risk, an unintended consequence that would 
certainly undermine the prospect of `dying in peace’.  
 
Among the professionals we interviewed, the notion that childhood testing might be 
exploited as `a means to an end’ was rhetorically managed in a number of different ways. The 
counsellor above had, at one point, clearly stipulated that libertarian arguments supporting 
parental requests for testing (on the grounds that the child would benefit from testing because 
it would relieve parental anxiety) were explicitly countered through this means-end rationale. 
In the next extract, we show how other rhetorical means are used to illustrate the dangers that 
may arise when the child’s best interests are apparently ignored. In this more complex 
scenario, the professional (P) has just contextualised her move from paediatrics to clinical 
genetics, and provides an account of an early case in her career. Just before narrating this 
account, she adds: `I always tell this story in the lectures I give’.  
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Extract 2 
P: And I was completely not ready for this and they were sitting there (.) mother was a social 
worker and dad was a very uptight business man in a suit- or looked like a business man; very 
sort of uptight (.) and we were talking and this boy had got the help he needed in the school and 
he was needle phobic and they were sitting- and really a very sweet kid about – I don’t know, 
thirteen, whatever (.) and- but young, very young (.) you know, because he was developmentally 
delayed (.) and the mother was saying look, you know, if these tests will do him good then you 
know, that’s fine (.) but I really can’t see- he’s needle phobic, de-de-de-de (.) and what benefit 
will it be, de-de (.) anyway it transpired that they are actually getting divorced and the reason the 
father was there was that he’d been told by his sister who read a woman’s magazine, that this is 
likely to be fragile X (.) if it was fragile X he could blame her, the soon-to-be-ex-wife, because it 
was carried by women and therefore he’d a) get custody of the child and b) get a better divorce 
settlement. 
R: Oh, what 
 
Quite different to the scenario of the `anxious mother’ in extract 1, we have here the encoding 
of multiple participants as well as more explicit character work to index stronger moral 
inferences about parental motivation. The account begins by orienting the listener (`And I 
was completely not ready for this…’) to an apparent breach of routine practice. The scenario 
we are about to hear is marked as somehow exceptional or unusual. She begins framing the 
account by assigning roles to the parents from which a particular estimation of character can 
be inferred: the mother who is `a social worker’, the father who is an `uptight business man’, 
which is nicely contrasted with the `very sweet kid’ who is cast at the centre of an adult 
dispute. However, the innocence of the child is not simply a rhetorical index (`but young, 
very young’) – it also signifies a symptom of developmental delay. The counsellor recruits 
the voice of the mother who is ambivalent about testing (`but I really can’t see -’), which is 
clearly framed in terms of the child’s best interests (`if these tests will do him any good…’). 
The narrative marker `anyway it transpired’ subtly orients the account to information that 
emerges after the clinical consultation of which further motivations are learned. The 
`divorce’ proceeding and the lay diagnosis of `fragile X’ by the father’s sister `who read a 
women’s magazine’ is effective in illustrating the cautionary tale that childhood testing can 
be exploited as an instrument of familial blame. It also foregrounds the unsavoury scenario 
that establishing the biological culpability of one parent provides a means of attributing a 
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`personal’ dereliction of duty to another. The researcher’s reaction to the account is included 
here (`Oh what’) to indicate its rhetorical success in eliciting both surprise and disproval.  
 
Elicitation of the child’s autonomy 
In the previous extracts of professional dilemmas we have seen how childhood testing is 
posed as a problem when parental rights threaten to supersede the best interests of the child. 
In this section, we consider examples in which the autonomy of the child presents certain 
clinical challenges for professionals. Some genetic counsellors described the difficulty of 
eliciting informed consent from children who fell somewhere between the category of 
`minor’ and `adolescent’. Counselling at this grey zone of autonomy required novel 
techniques of extricating children from the influence of parents to assess whether they can 
make informed choices. One genetic counsellor (GC) described counselling twelve/thirteen-
year-olds as `unbelievably difficult’; she was not convinced that they were `making informed 
decisions in the way that an adult would’. In the account below, she describes the uncommon 
example of a twelve-year-old who declines testing: 
 
Extract 3 
GC: I have had a twelve-year-old decline testing (.) his mother wanted him tested, went through the 
whole process, all assuming it was going to happen because it always goes ahead, this kid was 
deaf as well so it was really complicated counselling (.) and sitting in McDonalds I said, you’re 
going to go ahead with the test? And he said, no (.) his mother looked at him and she was 
saying, oh, you do want the test, and he just was shaking his head, she said, oh it’s because he’s 
worried about needles, and I said, well (.) if you didn’t have to have a needle would you have the 
test? Thinking we could do a cheek swab or something, he went, no, but he couldn’t really tell 
us why he didn’t want the test, but that was okay and thank goodness his mother was quite a 
reasonable person and she respected that and he came back three years later when he was ready, 
when his younger sister was coming in as well.  
 
We should note that this theme bears a close resemblance to `juxtaposition of parental rights 
vis-à-vis child’s autonomy’ because the child’s mother is requesting a test. The important 
difference, however, is that the child is old enough to be consulted independently of the 
mother. We are also expected to interpret `decline testing’ as an unusual outcome of 
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counselling. The reference to `all assuming it was going to happen because it always goes 
ahead’ is suggestive that children routinely endorse parental decisions – i.e. children often 
replicate the parent’s wishes. The twelve-year-old’s disability adds further complications to 
communicating complex issues. The reference to `sitting at McDonalds’ is an index to the 
counsellor’s previous remarks about techniques to facilitate communication outside the 
medical setting. Though she described this technique as a means of seeing children `by 
themselves’, the reported speech that follows would suggest that the mother was present 
during the counselling.  
 
The combination of reported speech (`I said’, `he said’) and constructed dialogue are 
successful in reproducing various tensions between the professional, the child and the mother. 
For instance, when the child initially declines the test (`he said no’), the mother can be heard 
searching for clarification (`oh, you do want the test’) as if the child was mistaken. The 
misalignment between the mother and the child is repeated (`he just was shaking his head’), 
at which point the mother attempts to repair the interaction by suggesting that the child is 
`worried about needles’ as opposed to displaying informed consent. Here, the counsellor’s 
use of constructed dialogue successfully orients to the mother’s motivation who clearly wants 
the child to consent to testing. Next we hear the counsellor skilfully neutralising the mother’s 
suggestion of phobia (`and I said, well (.) if you didn’t have to have a needle …’), which 
indicates that the test could be performed by other means (`cheek swab’). When the child 
declines again we assume the choice is a rational one. However, the suggestion of rationality 
is immediately countered when it is explained that the child was unable to justify his reason 
for declining. This illustrates the counsellor’s earlier point that children below the age of 
majority do not perform convincing displays of informed consent about complex risk. The 
above scenario is couched as a counselling `success story’ not because of the child’s 
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persistence in declining testing or even the complicated counselling involved, but because the 
mother `respected’ the child’s decision. She is morally cast as a `reasonable person’ because 
she did not challenge the child’s weak display of autonomy.  
 
Professionals often raised the concern that minors who consent to testing may be doing so 
on the basis of their parent’s wishes. One paediatrician (P) used the example of the `eight 
year old’ to illustrate the difficulty of knowing whether the child is speaking or whether 
parents are speaking through the child. He continued to explain that while measures such as 
Gillick competence are, albeit `subjective’, assessments of maturity, doctors have always 
employed such methods in `a beneficial way’. The presumption that doctors are experts of 
who is or is not mature was accounted for defensively: he contrasted the implied paternalism 
of medical authority with the paediatrician’s responsibility of preserving the `best interests’ 
of the child. In the account below, the same paediatrician is responding to the researcher’s 
question about whether there is any benefit from disclosing genetic information to children 
when they are `younger’.  
 
Extract 4 
P: I think there’s (.) I think kids end up carrying a lot of baggage anyway and I think to be 
lumbering and cumbering them with additional baggage for (.) which isn’t going to- why spoil 
their childhood? If it’s going to be bad news why spoil their childhood if it’s not going to help 
them at all? (…) I don’t think- I honestly don’t think there’s a right or wrong answer for what 
you should be doing, I like the idea that you shouldn’t be testing or giving that information until 
they are mature enough to understand it (.) and you can always make a- come up with an 
example, why don’t we just do that? But, I think you either have that rule or you don’t and I 
suppose if you decided on that rule you’re then left with some of the consequences of the, at 
some stage there’s going to be this jarring (.) and adolescence is- is a difficult period but it’s a 
difficult period for a number of reasons, a lot of which are that they’re actually coming to realise 
things that they weren’t aware of when they were children. (.) so I think it- I think adolescence is 
the time to start going through those issues, and I think to be telling a child, a young child, who 
particularly doesn’t have the maturity to fully understand some of these concepts is difficult (.) 
but I think you could argue that that’s a paternalistic view. 
 
The benefits of disclosure are offset by casting the child as somehow already overwhelmed or 
besieged by concerns that may compromise their autonomy: disclosing a genetic identity 
would simply add further anxiety (`additional baggage’). What is interesting is that by 
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accounting for nondisclosure, the paediatrician does not invoke ethical guidelines or 
biomedical principles. Instead, he proceeds with a subjective account (`I honestly think…’) 
that absolute principles (`right or wrong answer’) may not apply to professional decisions. 
This subjective formulation is extended (`I like the idea…’) to argue that delaying testing and 
disclosure until the child is `mature enough to understand it’ is a preferred judgement.  
 
The paediatrician continues to reflect on how judgements about maturity are formed. He 
orients to the possibility of making rules (`you can always make a-’), but then abruptly 
describes `an example’ which may serve as an illustration of how to apply professional 
judgements. The contrastive statement `but I think you either have that rule or you don’t’ sets 
up an either/or scenario which facilitates further ethical accounting: if assessments of 
maturity were rule-governed then professionals will be faced with `consequences’ where 
cases may not fit the rule (`at some stage there’s going to be this jarring’). The paediatrician 
explains that inevitably rules cannot account for all contingencies; in situated cases some 
kind of subjective, professional judgement is required. By orienting the account to a 
description of `adolescence’, the paediatrician is actually performing expertise by 
demonstrating an empathic awareness of this `difficult period’. The adolescent’s change in 
identity and increasing awareness of self is cast as an optimal period to disclose a `previous’ 
genetic identity (Armstrong, Michie and Marteau, 1998). The notion that a genetic identity 
might `spoil’ the child’s autonomy resonates with Davis’ (1997) ethical argument that 
children have a `right to an open future’. This position also reflects the current ethical 
guidelines which discourage disclosure if there is no medical benefit, implying that medical 
grounds take precedence over the possibility that early disclosure may have some 
psychosocial benefit (Robertson and Savulescu, 2001; Duncan and Delatycki, 2006).  
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The paediatrician infers that disclosing genetic information while the child is 
psychologically autonomous (i.e. capable of understanding changes within the self) is more 
beneficial to the child, and more ethical, than disclosing such information to children who 
cannot understand the implications of complex risk. However, the case of the latter seems to 
require further accounting about the professional role. Admitting that some are less 
autonomous than others might be construed as `paternalistic’. This defensive move seems to 
anticipate potential disagreement about whether medical professionals are well equipped to 
expertly assess autonomy.  
 
Avoidance of parental responsibility 
In contrast to scenarios where parents `want to know’ the genetic status of their child, some 
professionals cited cases where parents `don’t want to know’. In these accounts, affected 
parents, or parents aware of familial risk, were cast as avoiding responsibility for disclosing 
genetic information that may have important medical or social consequences for their 
children. The two cases we present here are very different, but they are linked in terms of the 
temporal (future) consequences of not-disclosing genetic information to children.  
 
In Extract 5, a Paediatric Nephrologist (P) is explaining how families usually have to 
overcome `some huge agenda’ in relation to genetic responsibility. She describes `a very 
interesting family’ who were unable to engage in risk communication with their children. She 
begins describing the scenario by assigning character attributes to each of the parents: the 
father `was a solicitor … a professional man’ who was diagnosed with polycystic kidneys 
`late in the stage of the disease’ and the `wife was an accountant’ who felt `absolutely 
incapacitated with guilt’. As we will see, framing the parents’ character in this way has 
important rhetorical implications for imputing responsibility.  
 20
 
Extract 5 
P: They didn’t want correspondence, I can’t remember all the things they didn’t want but you know 
they were absolutely unable to broach the subject with the children. 
R: Yeah. 
P: And I think that, I mean the problem is it’s never going to be right for them so really you know 
if you can’t tell your children when you’re 12 and, when they’re 12 and when they’re given an 
opportunity, they’re not going to be able to do it, I think one was 15 and doing ‘O’ levels and 
you know. 
R: Right. 
P: I think we did see them twice. 
R: Yeah. 
P: And clearly the children are just going to find out themselves at some time, and I mean, one of 
the things is that you know say the children get married have babies and then they find that 
they’ve passed it on to their baby and nobody told them and they’ve got two intelligent parents 
who obviously knew.  
 
The paediatrician frames the parents’ denial through the reporting of events (`They didn’t 
want correspondence’) in order to establish their evasive conduct. Despite her gloss of events 
(`I can’t remember all the things they didn’t want’), we are oriented to hear this account as a 
complete failure to initiate risk communication (note the use of `absolutely unable to 
broach…’). By framing the circumstances in absolute terms (`it’s never going to be right for 
them’), the paediatrician seems to suggest that self-initiated future disclosure is not likely to 
occur once they miss the `opportunity’ to disclose. Reference to the children’s age (`I think 
one was 15’) is suggestive that they are certainly autonomous enough to benefit from 
disclosure at the current time. Furthermore, the statement `I think we did see them twice’ 
infers that the parents were indeed provided opportunities but failed to reconcile their guilt. 
The rest of the interaction is taken up by a prospective account of the ethical and genetic 
implications of failed disclosure. Framed as a self-evident scenario (`clearly the children…’), 
the paediatrician describes the hypothetical situation that the children will only learn of their 
carrier status once the mutation is passed onto their own children. The last two statements 
(`and nobody told them’, `they’ve got two intelligent parents’) succeed in framing the 
account as a cautionary tale. The blameworthiness of the parents is inferred but palpable: 
educated professionals are expected to engage in responsible risk communication.  
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In the above account, deferring responsibility is largely posed as an ethical dilemma for 
parents, though other professionals indicated difficulties of dealing with families `who don’t 
want to know’. In the next account, we consider a similar scenario where parents have not 
disclosed genetic information and the adolescent in question has come to the clinic on her 
own. Unlike the previous account, the ethical dilemma below is clearly posed as a clinical 
challenge for the Paediatric Endocrinologist (P) who has to explain to the `17-year-old girl’ 
that she has male chromosomes:  
 
Extract 6 
P: One of the things that made me realise that parents don’t necessarily want to engage with us was my 
involvement with a 17-year-old girl who was referred to me because she had no secondary sex 
development (.) and she was tall so she clearly didn’t have Turner Syndrome (.) anyway we did the usual 
full work up at 17, found that she had a 46 XY karyotype, so, you know, quite a big issue to deal with, 
bright, intelligent girl, planning to go to university, very articulate, had come to the clinic on her own, and 
I thought, ah shit, how am I going to deal with this? So I rang the GP and the GP was- by pure chance 
happened to be an ex trainee of mine from (place), and I knew that she’d done psychology before she 
came into medicine, and I said, look, you know, I’m feeling very uncomfortable about dealing with these 
issues with this girl because she came to the clinic on her own, these are big issues we’ve got to discuss, 
and I’m not clear why the family aren’t supporting her.  
 
The Paediatrician frames the account in terms of his own realisation that some parents are 
unable or unwilling to come to the clinic in support of childhood testing, presumably for 
reasons of guilt (he later alludes to the mother’s guilt as a possible explanation). The 
detection of a `46 XY karyotype’ presents complex psychosocial issues about the girl’s 
gender and identity. These issues are made all the more difficult by building the girl’s 
character as an autonomous individual: `bright, intelligent girl, planning to go to university, 
very articulate, had come to the clinic on her own’. The self-reflexive question `how am I 
going to deal with this’ is an effective rhetorical display of professional responsibility and 
uncertainty (we will examine these markers of uncertainty in more detail in the next section). 
The ethical dilemma is framed in terms of the following: how does the professional convey 
sensitive genetic information without undermining the adolescent’s future autonomy? How 
does one tell a 17-year-old girl that she has male chromosomes?  
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The professional management of genetic disclosure is reported via contact with `the GP’. 
Fortuitously (`by pure chance’), the GP is known to the Paediatrician as an `ex-trainee’ with a 
`psychology’ background. The use of reported speech recounts the scenario to the GP as a 
breach of routine practice (`she came to the clinic on her own’), therefore involving careful 
and sensitive disclosure (`these are big issues we’ve got to discuss’). The pronoun `we’ is 
also indicative that the professional burden of disclosure is now shared. There is also the 
issue of the parents’ absence which warrants an account (`I’m not clear why the family aren’t 
supporting her’). After `a very constructive consultation’, it transpires that the mother was 
originally tested during pregnancy: the results of amniocentesis revealed the 46 XY 
karyotype. The paediatrician engages in the reconstruction of past events in order to explain 
the parent’s absence: the mother had `known all along that she was meant to have a boy’, but 
let the matter pass thinking `they’ve made a mistake’. When the daughter does not develop 
normally she is `completely unable to deal with it and unable to support her daughter in the 
appropriate way’. Thus, a psychosocial account of guilt and self-blame is produced to explain 
the parents’ absence.  
 
In this account of avoidance of parental responsibility, we detect the professional’s 
apprehension to engage the child’s autonomy without the support of parents. Furthermore, 
this absence usually requires some kind of accounting, that is, by casting a moral tale about 
the unfortunate consequences that occur when genetic disclosure is not performed within the 
family. So far, we have examined examples of ethical dilemmas which reconstruct the 
tensions between professionals, parents and children in matters of childhood testing. 
However, these cases also raise ambivalence about the professionals’ role. Professional 
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ambivalence was often accounted for when denying parental demands for testing or when 
counselling seemed to be at odds with the kind of support that families were seeking.  
 
Acknowledgement of uncertainty 
In this section, we examine how professionals account for uncertainty via reconstructions of 
troubling events and cases. In Extract 6 we noted how ambivalence arises from being 
confronted by the autonomous adolescent. In the following example, a genetic counsellor 
(GC) is narrating a scenario (consistent with parental rights vis-à-vis child’s autonomy) 
involving a `very aggressive, pushy’ father who `presented himself at clinic demanding that 
[his] children have carrier testing’ for cystic fibrosis. The researcher’s opening question 
orients to GC’s labelling of this particular case as a `very difficult one’: 
 
Extract 7 
R: Simply because he’s demanding it, it makes it awkward for you or? 
GC: I think not that he’s demanding it so much, that’s apparent (.) maybe it’s because he’s not doing 
what we think he should. 
R: Right. 
GC: Maybe it is as simple as that. 
R: Right. 
GC: But it’s- I don’t think he’s taken time to recognise, looked at himself and his need for doing it. 
R: Yes. 
GC: It’s a huge control issue. 
R: I see. 
GC: And why is that important to me?  And I don’t know because it is a bit of a struggle, there’s part 
of me that wants him to recognise that what he’s doing actually is about control, it’s about his 
own anxiety and it actually isn’t about the benefit of the children, is my belief (.) now I might be 
wrong. 
 
R is probing whether the difficulty of consulting the `demanding father’ was a personal 
burden. The invitation to give a subjective account is denied in favour of a speculative 
explanation (`maybe…’) of the father’s non-compliance with professional goals (note the use 
of `we’ to index the professional voice in `what we think he should do’). GC’s account of the 
problem is professional rather than personal. The `simple’ explanation offered is the practical 
difficulty of counselling parents who place their own needs and concerns above the interests 
of their children. In GC’s next turn, she proceeds to develop the father’s character as having 
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failed to examine his own motivations for testing. GC infers that the father cannot distinguish 
his own needs from that of his children, thereby seeking to `control’ his fears via testing. In 
the last turn, GC actually performs self-examination by directing a (rhetorical) question to 
herself: `And why is that important to me?’. In response to her own question she presents a 
professional self who is divided (`There’s part of me…’) and ambivalent (`I don’t know’). 
The `struggle’ she refers to harks back to the practical difficulty of managing parental rights 
and responsibilities. The formulation `and it actually isn’t about the benefit of the children’ 
subtly infers that the father would have argued this point: that it was precisely in the interests 
of the children that carrier testing should be performed. GC is claiming to know the father’s 
real motivations (i.e. `anxiety’ and `control’) which are concealed by the child’s best 
interests. There are, however, a number of devices which mitigate professional certainty 
about the father’s actual or presumed internal states: the father’s `anxiety’ is offered as an 
opinion (`my belief’), while her final remark (`now I might be wrong’) is offered as a 
concession. Mitigating this psychological assessment of the father not only signals 
professional ambivalence, but displays humility about making absolute claims of character 
and motivation.   
 
Professional uncertainty may also arise when professionals are sympathetic to the 
interests of parents. For instance, the same genetic counsellor (GC) explained a hypothetical 
case of a family requesting carrier testing under the circumstances where a child has `died 
horribly’ (from `a metabolic problem’) and the paediatrician `has a close relationship with the 
family’. Uncertainty arises when two competing interests are at work: the professional wants 
to help the grieving family, but at the same time must refuse childhood testing on the grounds 
that children ought to decide for themselves. The dilemma of counselling a family who 
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request a test after losing a child is powerfully conveyed by contrasting family, professional 
and personal perspectives.  
 
Extract 8 
GC: Doing something is what you’re trained to do, and then one has to say actually hang on a minute, not only 
have you lost a child and you feel you can give them this, we’re actually going to say no, it’s not a good 
idea because that’s theirs to have for themselves, that’s actually quite hard (.) you do- I do feel quite cruel 
sometimes 
R: Why? 
GC: Because- quite brutal even, because sometimes you can see that these people are- or where they are for 
probably the best possible reasons (.) and they- but they haven’t thought it through and you have to-  
R: And they don’t know-  
GC: Yeah, and they just want to do something. 
R: Yeah.  
GC: And you’re saying well, actually I’m not going to let you because I’m going to make you sit and talk to 
me 
 
Here, the counsellor is describing competing goals/intuitions of the professional role: the 
professional is `trained’ to help the grieving family by `doing something’, but is immediately 
checked by another voice (`and then one has to say actually hang on a minute’). The 
rhetorical purpose of this contrast is to signal that the right thing to do is sometimes counter-
intuitive. The counsellor engages in effective contrast work to develop this tension: she 
sympathetically weighs the concerns of the grieving family (`not only have you lost a child’) 
with her own power to grant such a test (note the personal `you feel you can give them this’), 
which is contrasted again with the professional voice (`we’re actually going to say no’). The 
decision to deny testing requires an account by way of endorsing the child’s autonomy 
(`because that’s theirs to have for themselves’). And while, ethically speaking, this may be 
the right thing to do, the counsellor conveys ambivalence (`I do feel quite cruel sometimes’) 
about – what may seem to the family – not `doing something’. This tension between `doing’ 
and `not doing’ is developed in the remainder of the interaction. GC concedes that the family 
are requesting a test for `the best possible reasons’ (given the loss of their child), but explains 
that they have not considered the autonomy of their remaining children (`they haven’t 
thought it through’). Not thinking it through is actually justification for counselling: a form of 
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doing something through talk and reflection. This is implicitly contrasted with the family’s 
perspective, which views counselling as a form of `non-action’ or `delaying’ medical action. 
In the final turn, this tension is expressed more explicitly by preventing the family from 
`doing something’ (i.e. seeking a genetic test for their children), which is accounted for by the 
counselling perspective (`because I’m going to make you sit and talk to me’).  
 
So far, we have examined cases of professional uncertainty where parents seem to be 
making unreasonable demands or requests for childhood testing. In our final case below, we 
return to the scenario in Extract 1, where the dying mother has demanded that all five of her 
children be tested. Many of the practitioners we interviewed explained that parents often 
thought of testing as a means of eliminating, not confirming, genetic risk. Once this anomaly 
of judgement was pointed out most parents accepted arguments in favour of the child’s 
autonomy. In rare cases, however, parents still persisted, in which case testing was a means 
of confirming parental fears that their children were indeed at risk. Here, the source of 
professional uncertainty is not the interpersonal difficulty of refusing a test, but how refusal 
may affect the children.  
 
Extract 9 
GC: This woman, in fact, she was fairly cluey, she knew that with FAP you can sometimes get bony changes 
in the face, and so she watched those kids and she’d feel their scalps to see if they had any bones, and 
she’d decided which children were already positive and which weren’t and was treating them accordingly 
(.) she was also fairly upfront about behaving a bit differently towards the ones – and that was quite a 
dilemma for me, because I was thinking, well, she’s already behaving differently on her basis of her 
assumptions about testing, are we actually doing harm by not testing because maybe it is better for her to 
treat the children appropriate to their genetic risk rather than this presupposition of what they had (.) on 
the other hand her assessment could have been quite accurate as well. 
 
An important aspect of recounting this scenario is the framing of the mother’s conduct 
towards her children. The characterisation of her perceptiveness (`she was fairly cluey’) and 
her medical knowledge (`she knew … you can sometimes get bony changes in the face’) 
construct a moral profile of the anxious mother who has taken it upon herself to monitor and 
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diagnose her children. The potential harm of lay diagnosis is at first implied (`and she 
decided which children were positive’) and then developed more strongly when we are told 
that she `was treating them accordingly’ and ‘behaving a bit differently towards the one’s’. 
The genetic counsellor succeeds in orienting her concern to the children who may be 
needlessly subjected to the mother’s medicalising behaviour. By the time GC signals `a 
dilemma’ we are urged to sympathise with her. In the account that follows, she takes us 
through her thinking: is it better to test knowing that the mother is treating (and possibly 
harming) the children on the basis of `her assumptions about testing’? Note how she adopts 
the professional voice (`are we actually doing harm by not testing’) to display ethical 
reflection. Though GC does not talk about ethical principles as such, she is weighing up the 
lesser of two evils: balancing maleficence with the children’s autonomy. Testing would mean 
that the mother could `treat the children appropriate to their genetic risk’. As a display of 
balanced thinking, the counsellor also concedes that the mother might be `accurate’ given the 
testimony of her character.  
 
In the overall accounting of this case, the counsellor foregrounds professional uncertainty 
by developing the character of the mother as a potential danger to the children, by adopting 
the perspective of the children, and by orienting to future (ethical) scenarios. All this 
facilitates a complex account which seeks to justify professional practice: `That was a really 
difficult situation to deal with because really what she needed was counselling, and good 
counselling’. In the end the `eldest child’ tested negative as a carrier of FAP. Though 
delighted with the news, the mother is later heard to say `Right, now I want the rest done’.  
 
DISCUSSION/CONCLUSION 
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In the context of genetic services, it is true that an unusually high premium is placed on 
patient autonomy (Bosk, 1993) not simply as the right to choose but the responsibility to 
make complex choices about healthcare. These choices are further complicated when they 
involve the health and welfare of others for whom `rights’ (to know or not know) and 
`autonomy’ (the right or ability to choose) are ethical considerations. The genetic testing of 
children is one such area in which parental rights and responsibilities come into conflict over 
what constitutes the `best interests’ of the child. Another way of posing this dilemma is that 
professionals have a stake in protecting the child from the anxieties and curiosities of parents. 
There is, however, an additional problem which is particularly relevant to testing children: 
who should assess when and under what circumstances that children are endowed with the 
capacity to engage in autonomous decision-making (i.e. informed consent). Naturally, issues 
such as these are manifestly related to uncertainties and ambiguities of professional practice, 
leaving individual professionals to do ethical `boundary-work’ (Ehrich et al., 2006) in 
situated encounters.  
 
We agree with Bower et al. (2002: 184) that interviews `yield more detailed descriptions 
of the types of ethical/professional situations encountered’ and our analytic themes certainly 
attest to the types of situations in which dilemmas over childhood testing emerge. For 
instance, the first three themes we uncovered – juxtaposition of parental rights vis-à-vis 
child’s autonomy, elicitation of the child’s autonomy and avoidance of parental responsibility 
– foreground the professional agenda concerned with the child’s right or ability to choose. In 
the first case, parents are critiqued for fulfilling their rights and wishes without properly 
considering the child’s point of view. This calls for professionals to adopt an advocacy 
position whereby the child’s voice is heard so that testing might be delayed until they are 
autonomous enough to decide for themselves. In the second case, when children are closer to 
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the age of majority, the issue becomes whether the professional can assess or elicit autonomy 
as the capacity to choose, given the extremely variable individual circumstances. Here, the 
professional must be satisfied that children can demonstrate capacity independently of 
parents. In the third case, the autonomous child is abandoned by the parents, which raises 
psychosocial concerns about guilt, failed risk communication, and familial support for 
complex decision-making.  
 
While typologies are no doubt useful for categorising and anticipating professional 
dilemmas, we believe that analytic attention should also be given to the way that such 
categories are discursively communicated and constructed. In our analysis we have focussed 
on the rhetorical dimension of ethical/professional dilemmas: the way the professionals 
persuade and convince us that certain characters and events are problematic, and warrant 
reflection prior to intervention. The most significant device we found was the use of contrast 
structures to contest or endorse different states-of-affair. Contrast devices facilitate the moral 
positioning of actors to assign responsibility or blame. For instance, moral profiles of the 
`pushy’ mother, the `aggressive’ father, and the `innocent’ child are particularly effective in 
upgrading the seriousness of dilemmas and narrating cautionary tales: children should be 
treated as ends rather than means, parents have failed to `think it through’ the testing process 
and possible unintended consequences etc. Contrast devices are also constructed through the 
categorisation of events which justifies professional action. The counsellor’s dilemma is more 
compelling, for instance, when parents are cast as `demanding’ rather than `requesting’ tests. 
Furthermore, contrast work is performed through the strategic recruitment of clients’ voices, 
like the case of the 12-year-old child who declines testing despite the mother’s coercive 
remarks (cf. Extract 3). Ethical explanations are more powerfully conveyed when the 
 30
contrastive nature of characters, voices and events are encoded to depict `extreme case 
scenarios’. Such accounts, we believe, bolster the justificatory role of professional accounts.  
 
The last of our four themes – professional ambivalence – must be treated separately from 
the others because it is not specifically a dilemma concerning parental rights or the child’s 
autonomy, but a dilemma of professional conduct. As we have seen, professionals display 
ambivalence about the difficulties of counselling anxious parents (`And I don’t know because 
it is a bit of a struggle’), denying testing to grieving families (`I do feel quite cruel 
sometimes’), or counselling the solitary teenager (`how am I going to deal with this?’). It is 
also worth noting that professionals were implicitly ambivalent about the application of 
ethical codes or principles on the one hand, while being explicitly ambivalent about 
counselling difficult or troubling cases on the other. This suggests that while the application 
of ethical codes is cited as a potential problem for professionals the codes themselves are not 
the main source of professional ambivalence. We believe that the unexpected contingencies 
and unintended consequences of clinical interactions with parents and children are the most 
troubling aspects of everyday professional practice. Even when professionals know what 
principle or code to implement, accomplishing it through talk is a practical, interactional 
difficulty.  
 
This raises serious concerns about the utility of code-oriented ethics. As Edgar (1994) has 
remarked, ethical codes can lead to a situation which, over time, is detrimental to professional 
practice. For instance, most individuals apply codes to justify their actions as we have seen in 
the case of our thematic typologies (i.e. genetic professionals give accounts about deterring 
testing on the grounds of the child’s autonomy). But codes also work to restrict how 
professionals account for their own behaviour. Conduct that falls outside these explanatory 
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frameworks are rendered unaccountable and therefore become silenced. This creates an 
institutional scenario where codes put the grounds of interpretation outside the scope of their 
own ethical criticism. In other words, codes of ethics tend to exclude or prohibit the 
innovatory potential of new interpretations about ethical/professional practice. 
 
We suggest that accounts of professional ambivalence are a valuable source of 
interpretation because they go beyond mere justifications of ethical codes. They indicate that 
ethical dilemmas reside not in knowing what code to implement when but in how to 
accomplish professional ethics through interaction. In the context of childhood testing, 
professional ambivalence is symptomatic of the power relations that are manifest in difficult 
interactions with parents and children regarding access to genetic services. These dilemmas 
are suggestive that more attention is needed to facilitate `interactional expertise’ (Sarangi, 
2005) as the basis of managing difficult and challenging encounters, including the competent 
performance of boundary-work. Future research should pay more attention to understand the 
way professional practitioners construct and share cases as useful illustrations of evidence-
based, situated ethical practice. 
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